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STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Mercedes Turner ("Turner") filed a Complaint stating two causes of 
action against Respondent City of Lapwai ("City"): a wage claim based upon the Idaho 
Wage Claim Act, I.C. §§ 4S-601 to -621, and an expense reimbursement claim 
presumably based upon Idaho common law. (R Vol. I, pp. 7-8.) The City sought 
summary judgment on both causes of action because: (1) Turner failed to file a sufficient 
notice of either of her claims as required by Idaho Code §§ SO-219, 6-902(7), 6-906, and 
6-907, and (2) Turner's wage claim is barred by the six-month statute oflimitations made 
applicable by Idaho Code § 4S-614. 
The District Court granted summary judgment on both causes of action based on 
Turner's failure to file a sufficient notice of claim. (R Vol. I, pp. 119, 12S-26, 128-29.) 
The District Court was not required to reach the City's alternate statute of limitations 
argument regarding the wage claim. (R Vol. I, p. 119 n.l.) Turner filed a timely Notice 
of Appeal. (R Vol. I, pp. 130-33.) 
II. District Court Proceedings 
The City agrees with Turner's statement of "Procedural History" (Appellant's Br. 
S), except that the City'S motion for summary judgment and supporting brief were filed 
on July 3, 2013. (R Vol. I, pp. IS, 17.) 
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III. Relevant Facts 
Turner was hired by the City in May 2006 as City Clerk and City Treasurer. (R 
Vol. I. p. 5 ~, 5-6.) Turner's employment with the City was terminated on January 20, 
2011. (R Vol. I, p. 6, 14, p. 25'4.) 
Later that day, Turner submitted a check request for her alleged wages -
including hundreds of hours of alleged compensatory ("comp") time, sick time, and 
vacation pay - to the City's outside, private auditing firm. (R Vol. I, pp. 67-74.). 
Turner mailed a follow-up letter dated February 1, 2011 to Mayor Hernandez. (R Vol. I, 
p.76.). 
On February 3, 2011, the City paid Turner her last paycheck. (R Vol. I, p. 45, p. 
64 , 12, p. 75.) The paycheck included the 84 hours of wages to which the City then 
believed Turner was entitled, but not the hundreds of hours of alleged comp time, sick 
time, and vacation pay shown on Turner's check request. (R Vol. I, p. 7, 16, p. 75.) 
On February 28, 2011, Turner sent an email and letter to a single member of the 
five-member City council regarding the additional comp time, vacation pay, and mileage 
reimbursement she was allegedly owed. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) On March 21, 2011, 
Turner received a letter from Mayor Hernandez advising her that the City would notifY 
her after reviewing her request for additional comp time and "other reimbursable items" 
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with an outside accounting service. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) The City made no further payment 
to Turner. 
Turner filed her Complaint on December 21, 2012, which was 23 months after her 
last day of employment with the City. (R Vol. I, pp. 4-9, p. 25 ~ 4.) 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The City believes the issues on appeal are most accurately stated as follows: 
1. Is Turner's expense reimbursement claim barred for her failure to file a 
claim with the City clerk as required by Idaho Code § 50-219? 
2. Is Turner's wage claim barred for her failure to file a claim with the City 
clerk as required by Idaho Code § 50-219? 
3. Is Turner's wage claim barred by the statute of limitations made applicable 
by Idaho Code § 45-614? 
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ARGUMENT 
Turner asserts two claims in this case: one for unpaid wages, and one for 
unreimbursed expenses. (R Vol. I, pp. 7-8.)1 
Turner's wage claim was properly dismissed if the City is correct either that 
Turner failed timely to file a sufficient claim detailing her wage claim or that her cause of 
action was subject to the six-month statute of limitations made applicable by Idaho Code 
§ 45-614. 
Turner's expense reimbursement claim was properly dismissed if the City is 
correct that Turner failed timely to file a sufficient claim detailing her reimbursement 
claim. 
Summary judgment was warranted on all of these grounds. The District Court's 
judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
I. TURNER FAILED TO PRESENT AND FILE A "CLAIM" FOR EITHER 
OF HER TWO DEMANDS. 
Any person with a claim for damages against a city must file her claim "as 
prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code." I.e. § 50-219. SatisfYing this notice 
requirement is a "mandatory condition precedent" to bringing suit. Banks v. Univ. of 
1 The City denies Turner's substantive assertions regarding the nature of her employment 
agreement - most particularly her claimed right to accrue hundreds of hours of comp 
time payable upon termination. However, the City accepts that Turner's averments must 
be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment. 
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Idaho, 118 Idaho 607, 608 (1990); see also I.C. § 6-908. Turner agrees that both of her 
claims are subject to this notice requirement. (R Vol. L pp. 51-52.) 
Three separate statutory provisions of title 6 are particularly relevant to Turner's 
two claims. 
First, Idaho Code § 6-902(7) defines the word "claim" as "any written demand to 
recover money damages from a governmental entity ... " I.e. § 6-902(7). The "claim" 
must thus be in writing and demand money damages. 
Second, Idaho Code § 6-906 provides a 180-day time limit for the filing and 
requires that it "shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political 
subdivision." I.C. § 6-906. 
Third, Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that the claim contain certain elements of 
information. Among other things, the claim "shall accurately describe the conduct and 
circumstances which brought about the injury or damage" and the claim "shall contain 
the amount of damages claimed." I.C. § 6-907. 
Idaho Code § 6-907 also contains a "savings clause" that addresses certain 
inaccuracies in stating the content required by that same § 6-907: 
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid 
or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature 
or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental 
entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
I.C. § 6-907 (emphases added). 
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A. The Savings Clause of § 6-907 Does Not Cure Deficiencies Other Than 
Inaccuracies of the Content Required by § 6-907. 
The gravamen of Turner's argument is that this savings clause cures many defects 
relevant to Turner's various communications and shifts the burden to the City to prove 
those defects were prejudicial. (Appellant's Br. 22-25.) Four points are critical to a 
proper analysis of this savings clause in light of Turner's arguments. 
First, the savings clause limits its curative effects only to claims "filed under the 
provisions of this section" - i.e., a "claim[] presented to and filed with a governmental 
entity." I.e. § 6-907 (emphasis added).2 The savings clause does not address all writings 
of any nature. To the contrary, it presumes a "claim" has been properly "filed" in 
whatever manner the statute may otherwise require. This is consistent with § 6-908's bar 
on claims that are not "presented and filed within the time limits prescribed" by the 
statute. See I.C. § 6-908. 
Second, the savings clause addresses and excuses only non-prejudicial 
inaccuracies in stating the content required by that same section, i.e., § 6-907. It does not 
address or excuse omissions of the content required by § 6-907. 
Third, the savings clause does not address - much less excuse - any other 
requirement stated in another section of the statute: namely, the requirement that a claim 
2 A "governmental entity," in tum, "means and includes the state and political 
subdivisions" defined in § 6-902. I.C. § 6-902(3). 
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be "written," I.C. § 6-902(7); that it demand "money damages," id.; that it be filed within 
the 180-day time limit, I.e. § 6-906; or that it be presented to and filed with the city clerk, 
id. 
Fourth. the phrase "or otherwise" read in context excuses inaccuracies in stating 
the other contents required by § 6-907, such as the "conduct," "circumstances," "names," 
and "residence" also required by § 6-907 but not listed in its savings clause. See I.C. § 6-
907. 
But the savings clause would swallow chapter 9 whole if the phrase "or otherwise" 
had the effect of excusing even the requirements stated in other sections of the chapter -
for example, § 6-902(7)'s requirement for a "written" demand, or § 6-906's requirement 
of presentment and filing upon a particular identified official within 180 days. Were the 
phrase "or otherwise" accorded such sweeping meaning, the District Courts would be 
compelled to conduct fact-intensive prejudice determinations resulting from orally stated 
demands, or written demands sent to any government employee, or demands submitted 
after 180 days. 
The savings clause simply states the Legislature's policy choice that a claim shall 
not be rejected "by reason of" an inaccuracy in content. See I.C. § 6-907; Smith v. City of 
Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621 (1978) (analyzing § 6-907 and noting "there was nothing in 
the record to suggest that the city was 'misled to its injury' Qy any deficiencies in the 
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contents of the letter" (emphases added)). The savings clause does not state that a claim 
shall not be rejected "by reason of' omissions of content or failing to satisfy the 
requirements of other sections of chapter 9. See I.C. § 6-907; see also I.C. § 6-908. 
Thus, for example, a demand stated orally to the city clerk, within 180 days, and 
containing perfect content required by § 6-907 is invalid because it is not even a "claim" 
in the first place: the statute defines a "claim" as a demand that is "written." I.e. § 6-
902(7). The savings clause of § 6-907 and prejudice inquiries would be irrelevant. See 
Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 748 (1995) (declining plaintiff's argument that 
"written or oral notice may be sufficient ... as long as the State is not prejudiced by the 
manner of imparting notice"). 
This construction does not eviscerate the statute or the savings clause. It honors a 
policy choice not to deny claims for non-prejudicial content inaccuracies. Turner's 
reading of § 6-907 would eviscerate the statute by permitting broad curative effects that 
will require significant discovery and litigation to resolve. The Legislature created a 
bizarrely specific statutory scheme if the entire judicial inquiry was simply intended to 
be, "Was the governmental entity misled to its injury?" That is not the law in Idaho. 
1. The Savings Clause Does Not Cure Turner's Failure to Present Her 
Requests to the City Clerk. 
As discussed below, the City does not accept that Turner's requests, cumulatively 
or otherwise, constituted a "claim," i.e., a "written demand to recover money damages." 
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See I.C. § 6-902(7). But even if they were cumulatively considered a "claim," Turner has 
never argued or could argue that she presented anything to the City clerk or filed 
anything with the City clerk's office. See I.C. § 6-906; Appellant's Br. 16. 
As demonstrated above, the savings clause of § 6-907 purports neither to address 
nor to cure the requirement of § 6-906 that a claim "shall be presented to and filed with 
the clerk" of the City. See I.C. §§ 6-906, 6-907. The savings clause is irrelevant to that 
analysis. As discussed below, none of the cases Turner cites alters this requirement. 
This alone provides a sufficient basis to affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
both of Turner's claims. 
2. The Savings Clause Does Not Cure Turner's Failure to State the 
Amount of Her Expense Reimbursement Claim. 
Similarly, even if Turner's requests for expense reimbursement, cumulatively or 
otherwise, were considered a "claim," they fail because none noted the amount of her 
2010 expenses, even though they were surely within her knowledge by the time she made 
her requests in 2011. (See R Vol. I, pp. 66-79.) 
The Court can scour the record before it and it will not find - over two and a half 
years after Turner's termination - a simple statement of the amount the City owed her 
for unreimbursed expenses. 
As demonstrated above, the savings clause in § 6-907 does not cure omissions of 
the information required by that same section. This includes the requirement that the 
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claim "shall contain the amount of damages claimed," at least where the plaintiff knows 
or could calculate the amount. See I.C. § 6-907. 
Again, none of the cases Turner cites alters this straightforward requirement. 
Turner's failure to state the amount of her expense reimbursement claim renders that 
claim invalid under § 6-907. 
B. Smith and Huff Do Not Assist Turner's Case. 
As plaintiffs have done unsuccessfully for over three decades, Turner relies upon 
Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618 (1978), and Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274 (1982), for 
the proposition that Turner's cumulated requests fulfilled the purposes (since not the 
requirements) of Idaho Code §§ 50-219,6-902(7), 6-906, and 6-907. (See Appellant's 
Br.23-25.) 
This reliance, as for past plaintiffs, is misplaced, because this Court has over the 
past three decades since deciding Smith and Huff repeatedly distinguished the cases and 
rejected a simple inquiry into whether the purposes of the statutes were met and whether 
the governmental entity was, per § 6-907, "misled to its injury." See, e.g., Blass v. 
County of Twin Falls, 132 Idaho 451, 452-53 (1999) (rejecting a plaintiffs reliance on 
Smith even where county-owned hospital admitted it would not have conducted any 
different investigation had a sufficient claim been filed); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 
745,748 (1995) (distinguishing Huffand holding notice insufficient even where the State 
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was on actual notice of claim within one week of accident, conducted a full investigation, 
and was not prejudiced by the insufficient notice); Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth.. 126 
Idaho 484, 487 (1994) (distinguishing Smith and HufJ and holding that written notice to 
city's insurer and oral statements to city representative were insufficient); Stevens v. 
Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 531 (1989) (distinguishing Smith and HufJ and holding that 
letter apprising city of insurance claim made directly by plaintiffs was insufficient 
because letter to city was not sent by plaintiffs themselves). 
Turner is thus incorrect to argue that "Idaho courts have consistently applied a 
'substance over form' analysis to tort notices." (Appellant's Br. 23.) Turner claims this 
by simply disregarding this Court's cases consistently distinguishing and limiting Smith 
and Huff. 
Regardless, Smith and HufJare just as easily distinguished here because, in each of 
those cases, notice was provided directly to "the clerk or secretary of the political 
subdivision" as required by § 6-906. In Smith, the plaintiff's complaint averred (and 
evidence demonstrated) that the plaintiff's letter was sent to the city clerk. See Smith, 99 
Idaho at 619. 
In Huff, the Court specifically noted that the secretary of the political subdivision, 
I.e., the irrigation district, personally received notice of the claim in the plaintiff's 
presence, when the receptionist discussed it with the secretary and kept photocopies for 
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the secretary's office. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275, 276-77. Contrary to Turner's 
argument, it is irrelevant that the claim was initially handed to a receptionist (see 
Appellant's Br. 17-19), because it was presented to and filed with the office of the 
official identified in the statue. 
Since deciding Smith and Huff, the Court has not relented on this statutory 
requirement of § 6-906. In both Avila, 126 Idaho at 748, and Friel, 126 Idaho at 486, the 
Court rejected the Court of Appeals' holding in Sysco Intermountain Food Service v. City 
of Twin Falls, 109 Idaho 88 (Ct. App. 1985), that notice to a City's insurer could 
substitute for notice to the officer designated in § 6-906. See also Blass, 132 Idaho at 453 
(notice to insurance adjuster and forwarded to proper official at hospital still not 
sufficient). 
Smith, Huff, Friel, Avila, and Blass are all consistent: notice to persons other than 
the official named in § 6-906 is not notice at all, and so inquiries about prejudice, 
inaccuracy, substantial compliance, or otherwise are irrelevant. Cf Stevens, 116 Idaho at 
531 ("Since the City had no actual notice, whether or not it was misled to its injury by 
failure to provide formal notice is irrelevant. "). Turner has never asserted that she 
presented and filed anything with the City clerk. 
Similarly, in both Smith and Huff the amount of damages claimed was included as 
required by § 6-907, or the damages were specifically stated to be unknown but 
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forthcoming. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 276 (noting amount presented to secretary); Smith, 
99 Idaho at 621 (noting "subrogation claim will be presented as soon as we have the total 
damages completed"). 
Turner asserts that the amount of her claim was plain from the paycheck request 
she faxed to the outside, private auditor's office 16 miles outside the City. (Appellant's 
Br. 11; R Vol. I, pp. 66-67.) But the paycheck request and fax nowhere stated the 
amount of Turner's unreimbursed expenses. (See R Vol. I, pp. 66-73.) Neither did 
Turner's letter to the mayor or her email or her letter to a single City councilor, sent over 
the subsequent months. (See R Vol. I, pp. 76-79.) This omission is not saved by § 6-
907, Smith, Huff, or any other Idaho law. 
The above facts and authority are sufficient to resolve this case and affirm the 
District Court. But Turner asserts other arguments that require response. 
C. Turner's "Officials of Greater Rank" Are Irrelevant and Were Not 
Empowered as Turner Assumes. 
Turner argues that it is sufficient that "officials of greater rank and authority" with 
the presumed "authority to pay [Turner's] claim" were presented Turner's requests. 
(Appellant's Br. 16.) This argument is incorrect for several reasons. 
First, it incorrectly assumes the mayor and a single City councilor out of five City 
councilors had the authority to pay tens of thousands of dollars in wages to a terminated 
employee. This is perhaps self-evidently incorrect. The five-member City council had 
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that authority. Turner has provided no evidence that any other City council member 
received any of Turner's requests. 
Turner's false assumption reveals the danger of accepting her novel argument and 
driving a hole through § 6-906's requirement of presentment upon the clerk or secretary 
of a political subdivision. The District Courts would be tasked with fact-intensive 
determinations regarding which "officials of greater rank and authority" in a given case 
are better suited to receive notices of claims than the officials designated by the 
Legislature. Turner's argument is incorrect substantively - the mayor and single City 
councilor were not so empowered - and it is misguided as a policy matter. 
Second, in advancing this argument, Turner overplays the significance of the 
receptionist in Huffhaving been handed the notice of claim. (Appellant's Br. 17.) It did 
not matter who literally was the first to touch it, because that person immediately turned 
and advised the official authorized by statute of the claim and kept photocopies for that 
official's office. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275,276-77. That is why this Court wondered 
what more the plaintiff could have done by way of presentment. See id. at 277. Was he 
to have asked for it back and handed it to the irrigation district secretary himself? 
But it was also irrelevant whether the secretary of the irrigation district was 
empowered to pay the claim. That is not the analysis contemplated by the statute or Huff. 
Turner falsely assumes that delivery to the mayor of a city the purported decision 
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maker - is the Legislature's ultimate goal. A straightforward example proves that is 
unfounded: if Turner had presented a notice of claim to the City clerk, that clerk could 
have turned and handed it to a summer intern with absolutely no power whatsoever -
and the City still would have been properly noticed and bound by the Clerk's action. 
It is irrelevant for purposes of § 6-906 to whom the City clerk transfers a notice of 
claim or whether they are empowered to pay it. It is only relevant that the notice be 
presented to and filed with the City clerk. Turner's arguments to the contrary are red 
herrings and analytically misleading. 
D. Cumulative Writings and Actual Notice Do Not Constitute a "Claim." 
Turner asserts that three requests, if taken "cumulatively," satisfy the statutory 
content requirements for damages claims set forth in Idaho Code § 6-907. (Appellant's 
Br. 8, 21.) Turner provides no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff can cumulate 
several written requests to different parties to meet the obligation to present and file with 
the proper official a single, sufficient "claim" for "money damages." See I.C. § 6-902(7). 
The Court should not accept Turner's invitation to make new law on this point. 
First, § 6-902(7) defines the word "claim" as "any written demand to recover 
money damages from a governmental entity ... " I.C. § 6-902(7). The word "demand" is 
in the singular. The statute, read in context, addresses the requirements for a single, 
written demand - and that demand stands or falls on its own as a "claim." 
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The demand may not have to be in a particular form, but it must satisfy certain 
statutory requirements, such as the presentment and filing requirement of § 6-906. Htif[ 
illustrates this perfectly: as informal as Mr. Huffs "demand" may have seemed, it was 
timely presented to the correct official's office, it was written, it detailed an amount of 
damages, and it contained no prejudicial inaccuracy. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275-77. 
For this Court to permit Turner's notice by cumulated writings - none of which is 
even presented to or filed with the proper official - would be a dramatic departure from 
the statute and this Court's case law. The entire statutory design and purpose of 
channeling the required content to a single identified official of each governmental entity 
would be destroyed. Instead, every governmental entity would be charged with the 
knowledge of every writing received by any of its employees that may - taken together 
with other writings received by other employees - cumulatively meet the elements of a 
claim. Such a rule would be absurd. 
This is why Judge Winmill held correctly in Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 F. 
Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Idaho 2011), that successive "demand letters" did not constitute notice 
of a "claim[] for damages" under § 50-219. See id. at 1258-59, 1263. The successive 
demand letters in Brown, like Turner's successive requests, were in some respects 
extensive. (See R Vol. I, pp. 88-101 (copies of relevant demand letters from Brown's 
Pacer record).) It is hard to imagine the City of Caldwell arguing that it was not on actual 
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notice of Mr. Brown's demands - even if they were sent to the fire chief instead of the 
city clerk, as Turner argues. (See Appellant's Br. 18-19.) 
But actual notice and lack of prejudice are not the beginning and end of the 
analysis, as Turner wishes they were. This Court has repeatedly noted that a "claim," as 
defined in § 6-902(7), is intended to place the governmental entity on formal notice that 
an aggrieved person "intended to go a step farther by bringing a tort claim." Pounds v. 
Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 427 (1991); accord Avila, 126 Idaho at 748 (quoting this 
passage from Pounds and holding notice insufficient where it did not state amount of 
claim or provide notice that plaintiff "was pursuing a tort claim"). 
This Court explained this statutory purpose even in Smith: 
[T]he government's actual notice of the injury did not obviate the need to 
satisfy those notice requirements. Mere knowledge of the injury does not 
necessarily put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is 
being prosecuted and thus apprise it of the need to preserve evidence and 
perhaps prepare a defense. 
Smith, 99 Idaho at 621; see also Stevens, 116 Idaho at 530. 
Turner's case is similar to the aggrieved employee In Pounds. Ms. Pounds 
endured an entire formal grievance process with the state university, which involved 
cumulative writings, hearings, and appeals, which plainly put the university on actual 
notice of her asserted injury: 
Pounds argues that she substantially complied with the notice requirement, 
and that the respondents received adequate notice of her claim, by the filing 
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of her grievance, the grievance hearing, and the appeal to the Personnel 
Commission, all of which occurred within 120 days of her last day of work. 
Pounds, 120 Idaho at 427. 
This Court nonetheless held that Ms. Pounds did not substantially comply with the 
statutory requirement to file a "claim," as defined in § 6-902(7): 
Id. 
Pounds' filing of her grievance did not provide adequate notice of a tort 
claim against the respondents. It provided notice that she had a grievance, 
but did not provide notice that she intended to go a step farther by bringing 
a tort claim. 
Turner insists that no "magic words" in Idaho law required Turner to put the City 
on notice of her claim once her informal requests went unsatisfied. (Appellant's Br. 12-
15.) This is incorrect. First, the above Supreme Court cases supply the "magic words." 
And, second, the definition of "claim" in § 6-902(7) as a "written demand to recover 
money damages" supplies the "magic words." I.C. § 6-902(7) (emphasis added). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "damages" as "[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to 
be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009) (emphasis added). Only when one's requests for wages and out-of-pocket 
expenses are denied or not timely paid does one have a claim for the "loss" or "injury" 
resulting from the refusal to pay. This Court's reasoning in the cases above simply 
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implements the statutory text defining a "claim" as a "demand to recover money 
damages." See I.C. § 6-902(7). 
The District Court was thus correct: Once Turner's personal requests went 
unsatisfied, Turner was obligated to put the City clerk on formal notice that she asserted a 
statutory claim against the City for unpaid (not to mention, trebled) wages and a breach 
of contract claim for expense reimbursements. Instead, she did nothing for nearly two 
years and then filed a lawsuit. 
E. Turner's Element-by-Element Presentation Obscures the Analysis of 
Her Requests and Her Two Distinct Claims. 
Turner must cumulate her requests, of course, because none of her requests by 
itself meets the statutory requirements for either of her two claims. The best illustration 
of this is that Turner's opening brief proceeds element by element to argue that each 
element of sufficient notice was met by at least one of her cumulated requests. (See 
Appellant's Br. 10-21.) This allows Turner to obscure the fact that each element must be 
satisfied for each of her two claims. 
For example, Turner's approach obscures the fact that, as already noted, nowhere 
in the record will the Court find the amount of Turner's expense reimbursement claim. It 
also obscures the fact that her first "request" - her faxed check request - was not 
presented to any City representative at all, but to an outside private auditing firm in 
Lewiston, which is 16 miles away. (See R Vol. 1, p. 67.) 
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For at least these reasons, the Court should consider in turn each of Turner's 
proffered writings to determine if any (1) demanded "money damages" in writing, I.C. 
§ 6-902(7); (2) was presented to and filed with the City clerk, I.C. § 6-906, (3) contained 
the content (even if non-prejudicially inaccurate, but not if outright omitted) required by 
§ 6-907, and (4) put the City "on notice that a claim against it [was] being prosecuted," 
Stevens, 116 Idaho at 530. None does. 
l. Turner's Check Request Is Not a "Claim." 
First - in support of her wage claim only - Turner asserts she "submitted a 
check request" on January 20, 2011 showing the amount of her wage request. 
(Appellant's Br. 7.) This check request, however, was sent from Turner's office on 
Turner's City letterhead to a person named "Kim," an employee of the City's outside, 
private auditing firm, Jergens & Co., in Lewiston, Idaho, which is 16 miles away from 
Lapwai. (R Vol. I, p. 67 (listing recipient's 746- prefix).) 
Turner wishes this Court to consider this check request as part of her cumulated 
requests, because it contains wage amounts, her residence address, and other required 
content. (Appellant's Br. 11,20-21.) The fax was sent on January 20, 2011, on Turner's 
last day of work. (R Vol. I, p. 25 ~ 4, p. 67.) It could not have provided notice of a 
"claim" for "damages," I.C. § 6-902(7), because Turner had no "damages," i.e., no "loss" 
or "injury." See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (definition of "damages"). 
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Turner had suffered no legal loss or injury on her last day of employment. 
Nobody had denied her anything. Similarly, an employee who submits her timesheet for 
signature at the end of a pay period has no "damages" for the wages then due, because 
she has suffered no loss or injury until she is refused timely payment as required by law. 
Turner submitted a draft paycheck. It omits material content required by § 6-907. 
It does not describe any injury, the names of any persons who promised her such 
exceptional wages, or the circumstances justifying her right to the demanded amounts. 
See I.C. § 6-907. 
Turner provided no evidence that this fax was ever shared with the City clerk. The 
fax to the outside, private auditor is entitled to no weight, and the Court should not 
consider it, cumulatively or otherwise. 
2. Turner's Letter to the Mayor Is Not a "Claim." 
Second, in support of both her wage and expense reimbursement claims, Turner 
asserts she mailed a letter dated February 1,2011 to Mayor Hernandez. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) 
Turner provides no evidence that the letter was shared with the City clerk. 
The letter does not contain the amount of either of her claims. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) It 
does not contain her address, residential or otherwise. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) The letter 
discusses retrieving her personal property and asks vaguely about her final paycheck. (R 
Vol. I, p. 76.) 
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There is not a scintilla of useful information about the paycheck's amount, the 
wage elements constituting it, justification for (or even a description of any alleged 
agreement supporting) its outlandish amount, the names of persons involved - nothing. 
(R Vol. I, p. 76.) Turner simply provides instructions for deductions. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) 
She vaguely mentions a mileage check without noting its amount or the 
circumstances behind the accrual of mileage. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) She asks for January 
2011 mileage to be calculated for her based on the City's bank records (R Vol. I, p. 76), 
instead of (as one might expect) her own mileage records. 
The letter to the mayor was not presented to the City clerk, and it omits material 
content required by § 6-907. It is entitled to no weight. 
3. Turner's Letter to One of Five City Councilors Is Not a "Claim." 
Third, Turner sent an email and an attached letter to a single member of the five-
member City council. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) The letter provides some elaboration but 
nowhere provides the amount of either of her claims. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) It does not 
contain any address, much less her residence. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) 
It does not explain the justification or agreement upon which she bases her claim 
to be paid 1,500 hours of comp time and vacation on top of her salary. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-
79.) Indeed, all of Turner's requests, like the record, are bare of any Council meeting 
minutes or other Council-approved agreement supporting Turner's alleged comp time and 
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vacation arrangement. She requests payment of vacation and comp time pay, but not sick 
leave pay. (R Vol. 1, p. 78 ~ 4.) She requests mileage reimbursement but not other 
expenses. (R Vol. I, p. 78 ~ 1.) 
Turner provides no evidence that her email or letter was relayed to the City clerk. 
To the contrary, Councilor Smith replied to Turner and specifically advised her to take 
her mileage and payroll requests - i.e., for all items except her request for payment of 
her legal bills - to '"the office," meaning the City clerk's office: 
I can check on #3, but I think the other request on [sic] this letter would be 
better served by the office. They have access to Cassel [payroll system] 
and files that you are making reference to. The City has had temporary 
people filling positions, although very competent, they are still getting a 
feel for where things are and how things flow. This information may assist 
them in their efforts to respond to your request. 
(R Vol. I, p. 85.) 
Councilor Smith did not offer to relay the e-mail message or letter to fellow City 
council members, the mayor, or the City clerk (R Vol. I, p. 85), and Turner offers no 
evidence that he did so. Rather, Turner was effectively placed on notice that she needed 
to take her mileage and payroll claims to the City clerk. She never did. 
4. Turner's Letter From the Mayor Proves Actual Notice, Nothing 
More. 
Lastly, Turner asserts that she received a letter from Mayor Ricky Hernandez 
advising her that the City would notify her after it reviewed her request with an outside 
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accounting service. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) But not even this letter, which is not on City 
letterhead, makes clear exactly what Turner requested or what amounts were at issue. (R 
Vol. I, p. 80.) The letter references comp time, but not vacation or sick leave; and it 
mentions "other reimbursable items," but does not indicate that the City knew what items 
or amounts were subject to reimbursement. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) The letter does not 
reference or deny a request - much less a "claim" for "money damages" - filed on a 
given date with anyone. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) 
In any event, as Smith, Pounds, Stevens, and Avila illustrate, the City's actual 
notice of Turner's request for payment of wages and expenses did not relieve Turner of 
the statutory requirement to provide the City clerk notice that she intended to further 
pursue her requests by a cause of action for damages. After Mayor Hernandez 
presumably failed to follow up within 30 days, Turner had an obligation to present the 
City clerk - to the exclusion of the rest of the world - with a "written demand" for 
"money damages" for unpaid wages under the Wage Claim Act and for breach of a 
contract to reimburse expenses. See I.C. §§ 6-902(7), 6-906. Such a claim, to be 
complete, should have apprised the City of the amounts of her claims and the circumstan-
ces or agreements that might possibly have justified her claim to damages for payment of 
1,500 hours of comp time and vacation far exceeding all limits made applicable by City 
policy, enforced in annual audits by the City's auditors, and disregarded by Turner. 
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Turner did not do this. Turner's claims were properly dismissed by the District 
Court. This Court should therefore affirm the District Court's judgment. 
II. TURNER'S WAGE CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Wage claims in Idaho are subject either to a two-year or six-month limitations 
period: 
Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and liquidated 
damages provided by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but 
any action thereon shall be filed either with the department or commenced 
in a court of competent jurisdiction within two (2) years after the cause of 
action accrued, provided, however, that in the event salary or wages have 
been paid to any employee and such employee claims additional salary, 
wages, penalties or liquidated damages, because of work done or services 
performed during his employment for the pay period covered by said 
payment, any action therefor shall be commenced within six (6) months 
from the accrual of the cause of action. . .. In the event an action is not 
commenced as herein provided, any remedy on the cause of action shall be 
forever barred. 
I.e. § 45-614. 
The two-year limitations period applies to claims for amounts that do not relate to 
and accrue in particular pay periods, such as severance pay, annual bonuses, or payments 
"on account." See, e.g., Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 367 (1984) 
(severance pay); Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337,342 (1968) (bonus); 
Anderson v. Lee, 86 Idaho 300, 303-04 (1963) (payments "on account" not attributable to 
particular pay periods). 
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A six-month limitations period applies where, as in this case, an employee claims 
additional amounts for wages for pay periods for which she has already received some 
payment. See, e.g., Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(additional partnership salary); see also, e.g., Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 
1080, 1085-86 (D. Idaho 2011 ) (overtime and "accrued vacation pay" not paid at 
termination); Long v. Idaho Rural Water Ass 'n, No. CV-05-303-S-EJL, 2007 WL 
1366534, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2007) (training fees for trainings provided on specific 
dates); Smith v. Micron Elecs., Inc., No. CV-01-244-S-BLW, 2005 WL 5328543, at * 6 
(D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2005) (unpaid overtime). 
A. Turner's Claim is Subject to a Six-Month Statute of Limitations. 
Wood is directly on point with this case and faithful to this Court's application of 
§ 45-614. The employer in Wood paid the plaintiff amounts it believed he was owed 
upon his termination. Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. Just like Turner here, the 
employee in Wood believed he was owed additional amounts for "accrued" and "unpaid" 
vacation pay and overtime. Id. He was terminated on January 20, 2009; paid his final 
paycheck on January 22, 2009; and filed a lawsuit nearly 10 months later on October 8, 
2009. Id. The Court granted the employer summary judgment, id. at 1087, because the 
plaintiffs claim was for "additional" wages for pay periods for which he had already 
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received payment and thus was subject to the six-month limitations period, id. at 1085-
86. 
Turner's case is materially identical. The below facts demonstrate beyond dispute 
that: Turner received payment for each pay period in which she alleges she accrued 
vacation, sick pay, and comp time; those amounts accrued in particular pay periods; and 
the allegedly accrued amounts became due upon her termination, when she had the legal 
right to be paid any accrued wages. 
It is undisputed that the City paid Turner her salary and wages for each pay period 
throughout her employment. (See R Vol. I, p. 25 ~ 6, pp. 27-41.) Turner's paystubs 
reflected the periodic accrual, use, and balance of the alleged wages she now seeks. (See, 
e.g., R Vol. I, pp. 45, 47.) Turner's own affidavit admits that her alleged comp time was 
accrued and payable for hours she allegedly worked "during each pay period." (R Vol. I, 
p. 63 ~ 6; see also id. ~ 5 (alleged comp time was earned for excess hours worked "during 
a given work week").) Turner thus accumulated her alleged wages in discrete, calculable 
amounts in each pay period over the course of her employment. See I.C. § 45-614 
(referring to "pay peri od[ s]"). 
Turner admits that the City paid her for all the "wages due and owing" the City 
believed were owed through the end of her employment. (R Vol. I, p. 7 ~ 16.) Her claim 
is for "accrued" and unpaid comp time, vacation, and sick leave. (See R Vol. L p. 7 
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~,-r 19-20.) She admits that these amounts are additional to wages she was already paid, 
i.e., "the remainder of her due and owing wages." (R Vol. I, p. 7,-r 16 (emphasis added).) 
In both Wood and Callenders, the Court noted that the plaintiff had pled "additional" 
wages. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; Callenders, 120 Idaho at 174. A plea for 
"remaining" wages is a plea for "additional" wages. 
Thus, in the words of the statute, "salary or wages have been paid to [Turner]," 
and she claims "additional ... wages" due to her "because of work done or services 
performed during [her] employment" for "pay period[ s] covered by said payment." See 
I.e. § 45-614. Therefore, Turner had only six months to file her action for unpaid wages. 
Turner's cause of action accrued no later than January 20, 2011, her last day of 
employment with the City. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86. The limitations 
period expired no later than July 20, 201l. She filed the present action on December 21, 
2012. (R Vol. I, p. 4.) Her wage claim is thus untimely and should be dismissed as a 
matter oflaw. 
B. Accrual of Wages Is Distinct From Accrual of a Cause of Action. 
In briefing and argument in the District Court, Turner misdirected the above 
analysis by repeatedly conflating accrual (or accumulation) of wages in each pay period 
over the course of employment with accrual of a cause of action for payment of those 
accrued wages upon termination of employment. (R Vol. I, pp. 56-60.) By insisting on 
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this conflation, Turner setup the following straw man argument she attributed to the City, 
but which the City did not and does not make: namely, Turner argued that the City's 
reading of the statute resulted in a new claim accruing and a new, six-month clock 
starting at the end of each of Turner's pay periods, which claim then expired six months 
later even while Turner was still employed. (R Vol. I, p. 57.) 
Turner's argument misapprehends the law and the City's analysis. Both parties 
agree that Turner's cause of action - even for alleged wages accumulated years before 
- accrued on her last day of employment, January 20, 2011, when she had a legal 
entitlement to be paid any wages that allegedly (1) had accumulated in each pay period 
over the course of her employment but (2) were not payable in cash until her termination. 
But there is also no genuine dispute that Turner seeks additional compensation that 
accumulated in pay periods for which she already received paychecks. Given these facts, 
Turner's cause of action is subject to a six-month limitations period under § 45-614. 
Several cases confirm that accrual of the cause of action is a separate inquiry from 
which statute of limitations applies under § 45-614. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel 
had to clarify confusion similar to Turner's in its unpublished opinion in Leher v. 
Western States Equipment Co., 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990): 
Although Leher may not have been entitled to the commission until April 
or May of 1987 ... this does not affect the applicable statute of limitations, 
but rather, the datc of the accrual of the action. 
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Id. 
The Court of Appeals in Callenders summarized the two distinct concepts 
applicable in this case perfectly: 
[An] action to collect ... wages must be commenced within six months 
after the cause of action accrues if the claim is for wages additional to those 
already paid. I.C. § 45-614. A cause of action for the collection of wages 
accrues when an employee has a right to collect the wages that are allegedly 
owed to him. 
Calie nders, 120 Idaho at 173-74. 
In briefing before the District Court, Turner cited two cases that do nothing more 
than confirm the City's position that Turner's cause of action accrued upon her 
termination. In Gilbert v. Moore, 108 Idaho 165 (1985), the plaintiff filed suit two weeks 
after his termination. Id. at 166-67. As Gilbert noted, 'The crucial issue is determining 
when Mr. Gilbert's cause of action accrued." Id. at 167. Because Gilbert's cause of 
action did not accrue until he was terminated, i.e., two weeks before Gilbert filed suit, the 
Court did not even address which statute of limitations applied. See id. at 167-68. 
Similarly, in Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916 (1988), the plaintiff 
had accumulated overtime that was payable upon his termination. Id. at 919. He filed 
suit to recover his accumulated overtime "within one month of [his] termination." Id. at 
918. 
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These cases simply support a point on which all parties agree: Turner's cause of 
action accrued upon her termination from employment. Neither case assists Turner, 
because in neither case did the plaintiff wait more than six months to file his lawsuit. See 
id.; Gilbert, 108 Idaho at 166-67. 
Turner's specious argument cannot stand in the way of the straightforward 
analysis of § 45-614 that follows from Turner's own pleadings and affidavit. 
C. Public Policy Does Not Support Application ora Two-Year Limitations 
Period. 
In the District Court, Turner appealed to public policy in support of application of 
a two-year limitations period. (R Vol. I, p. 60.) No liberality of construction or public 
policy remotely approves a claimant like Turner - fully apprised of all facts necessary to 
her claim to send several informal requests for payment of wages and then sit on her 
claim for another 22 months. 
Indeed, Turner's own evidence indicates that by at least February 28, 2011, when 
she sent her letter to Councilor Smith, she knew court action may be necessary, she was 
represented by an attorney, and she had researched some law relevant to wage claims: 
(1) her email expresses her wish not "to defend myself over this letter in court some day" 
(R Vol. I, p. 77); (2) her letter specifically references "my attorney" (R Vol. I, p. 78 ~ 3); 
and (3) her letter references her "claim with the US Department of Labor" and her belief 
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that "the law allows 48 hours" for an employer to pay demanded wages (R Vol. I, p. 78 
~ 4). 
Especially in light of these facts, public policy counsels against a liberal reading of 
the statute of limitations in this case, not for it. Turner provides no evidence justifying a 
22-month delay in filing her wage action. 
Regardless, as the cases demonstrate, there is no relevant ambiguity in the statute 
that justifies application of policy considerations or a two-year limitations period. 
Wood is directly on point with Turner's case and its analysis is consistent with this 
Court's case law. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86. Ultimately, Turner's own 
testimony in opposition to summary judgment (R Vol. I, p. 63 ~~ 5-6, p. 64 ~ 12) - as 
with her Complaint's request for "remain[ing]" wages (R Vol. I, p. 7 ~ 16) - plead her 
squarely into the six-month limitations period made applicable by § 45-614. Her wage 
claim is barred because she filed it well more than six months past January 20, 2011. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's entry of 
judgment in favor of the City on all of Tumer's claims. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2014. 
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